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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Criminal Law and Procedure-The Automaton Court: North
Carolina Places Burden on Defendant to Prove Unconsciousness
The criminal defense of unconsciousness has been recognized in
many states' and in England2 as a means by which a defendant, al-
though he has committed the act with which he is charged, can escape
criminal responsibility. Unconsciousness, often referred to as automa-
tism, occurs when one who engages in what would otherwise be criminal
conduct is at that time in a state of unconsciousness or semi-conscious-
ness.3 This defense, however, is not a simple one, and its use presents
several difficulties. The principal problems center on whether the
defense is in actuality only an offshoot of an insanity defense and"
therefore should require no separate treatment with respect to the appli-
cable criminal law and procedure and whether, assuming that uncon-
sciousness is a separate and distinct defense, the burden of persuading
the trier of fact that the defendant did the act while in a state of
unconsciousness should be on the defendant.
In State v. Caddell' the North Carolina Supreme Court was
presented both problems and in a nearly unanimous decision held that
the defenses of insanity and unconsciousness are not the same in nature
and that the burden rests on the defendant to establish his defense of
unconsciousness to the satisfaction of the jury. The court's decision is
unusual in that it not only refuses to follow its own precedent, as well as
strong California precedent and some English case law to the contrary,
but also bases its decision on the rationale that unconsciousness, al-
l. Initially Kentucky, California and Wisconsin recognized the defense in the late
1800's and early 1900's in court decisions. See People v. Methever, 132 Cal. 326, 64 P.
481 (1901); Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183 (1879); Oborn v. State, 143 Wis. 249,
126 N.W. 737 (1910). Other states soon followed with court decisions that approved
the unconsciousness defense and often the defense was incorporated into the state
statutory framework. See note 14 infra and accompanying text.
2. The English acceptance of the defense received full court support in Rex v.
Harrison-Owen, [1951] 2 All E.R. 726 (Crim. App.) and numerous cases thereafter. See
text accompanying notes 38-49 infra.
3. For further definition and discussion of the defense see 1 J. BISHOP, BISHOP ON
CRIMINAL Lw §§ 388, 395 (9th ed. 1923); 1 H. BRILL, CYCLOPEDrA. OF CRIMINAL IAW§§ 124, 128 (1922); 1 W. BTURDICK, THE LAw OF CRIME §§ 216, 217 (1946); W. LAFAvE
& A. Scotr, HANDBOOKs ON CRUMINAL LAw § 44 (1972) [hereinafter cited as LiFAvn]; J.
MILLER, MILLER ON CRIMmAL LAW § 39 (1934); H. WEIHOFEN, MEmAL DISORDER AS A
CRIMINAL DEmNSE (1954); 1 F. WHARTON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PaocEDURE
§ 50 (R. Anderson ed. 1957). See also 21 AM. JuR. 2d Criminal Law § 55 (1965); 22
C.J.S. Criminal Law § 55 (1961).
4. 287 N.C. 266, 215 S.E.2d 348 (1975).
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though "distinct" from insanity, is "akin" to it and hence the burden of
proof placed on the defendant with respect to insanity should likewise be
applicable to unconsciousness. 6 This result is a confusing mixture of
the true policy grounds and case law that properly justify the court's
conclusion.
Willis Tony Caddell was charged with kidnapping and was tried
before a jury in Guilford County. He entered pleas of not guilty and
not guilty by reason of insanity. At trial the State's evidence tended to
show that defendant kidnapped a fourteen-year-old girl, that he attempt-
ed intercourse with her, and that he choked and beat the victim over a
period of thirty minutes. Defendant testified in his own behalf and
stated that he "remembered nothing"' of the events of that day. He also
introduced medical testimony, contrary to the advice of his counsel, that
tended to show that defendant was not insane. Upon this evidence, the
superior court judge charged the jury with respect to the issue of
unconsciousness 8 and insanity, and the jury convicted defendant.
On appeal to the North Carolina Supreme Court, defendant asserted
that the jury instruction that the defendant does not have the burden of
proving unconsciousness and the instruction that the july should find
him not guilty if they found he was "completely unconscious' were
inconsistent. " Although acknowledging the truth of this contention, the
majority concluded that defendant did have the burden and that there-
fore the alleged error was harmless and in favor of defendant.' 0 Rely-
ing upon an analogy to the insanity defense and quoting some of the
5. Chief Justice Sharp and Justice Copeland dissented. See text accompanying
notes 57-60 infra.
6. 287 N.C. at 281-90, 215 S.E.2d at 358-63.
7. Id. at 272, 215 S.E.2d at 352.
8. The instruction read:
Now, members of the jury, a person cannot be held criminally responsible
for acts committed while he is unconscious. Unconsciousness is never an af-
firmative defense. Where a person commits an act without being conscious
thereof, such act is not criminal even though if committed by a person who was
conscious it would be a crime. The defendant has no burden to prove that he
was unconscious. If you find that the defendant was completely unconscious
of what transpired ... then he would not be guilty ....
Id. at 283-84, 215 S.E.2d at 359 (emphasis added).
9. The proper instruction when a defendant does not have the burden of proving
unconsciousness is that the jury should find the defendant not guilty unless they find
beyond a reasonable doubt that he was conscious of what transpired. In other words,
when the defendant does not have the burden, he only has to show "reasonable doubt"
and the state has the ultimate burden of persuading the jury that the defendant was
conscious of his acts. See generally State v. Mercer, 275 N.C. 108, 116, 165 S.E.2d 328,
336 (1969); LAFAvE, supra note 3, at § 44.
10. 287 N.C. at 284, 290, 215 S.E.2d at 359-60, 363.
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rationale in Bratty v. Attorney General for Northern Ireland,11 the court
concluded:
"The necessity of laying [the] proper foundation is on the defence:
and if it is not so laid, the defence of automatism need not be
left to the jury."
. . . We are unable to perceive a reasonable basis for distinction
. between insanity . . . and unconsciousness. . . . In [both)
defenses the contention is the same-the defendant did the act,
but should not be convicted because the requisite mental element
was not present. The same presumption, which casts upon the de-
fendant, claiming insanity, the burden of proving it to the satisfac-
tion of the jury, and thus to negative the presence of mens rea,
applies also to the defendant who asserts a temporary mental lapse
duo to [unconsciousness].12
The supreme court, therefore, placed the burden of proving uncon-
sciousness, to the satisfaction of the jury, on the defendant.
Unlike the situation in North Carolina, where contacts with the
automatism defense have been few, other American courts have dealt
extensively with the situation.'3 In fact, in some states the defense of
unconsciousness has been codified into state law.' 4  Where the defense
is recognized, various sources of automatism have been accepted by
court decision. These sources include somnambulism and somnolen-
ture,15 hypnotism,' 6 diabetic shock,'I epileptic black-outs,' 8 kleptoman-
11. [19613 3 All E.R. 523.
12. 287 N.C. at 288-89, 215 S.E.2d at 362-63 (emphasis added and deleted). Note
the court's reference to mens rea. See text accompanying notes 25, 50-55 infra.
13. For a broad treatment of the defense see Fox, Physical Disorder, Conscious-
ness, and Criminal Liability, 63 COLUM. L. REv. 645 (1963). See also Edwards,
Automatism and Criminal Responsibility, 21 MoDERN.L. REv. 375 (1958).
14. Aiuz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-134(2) (1973 Supp.); CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(5)
(1970); IIAHo CODE ANN. § 18-201(2) (1975 CuM. Supp.); MONT. Ry. CODES ANN. §
94-201(5) (1969); N-v. Rnv. SrAT. § 194.010(6) (1967); OnrA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §
152(6) (1958). The typical statute reads: "All persons are capable of committing
crimes except those belonging to the following classes: . . . Persons who committed the
act charged without being conscious thereof. . . ." CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(5) (1970).
15. Somnambulism is commonly referred to as "sleep-walking," while somnolenture
has been defined as "the lapping over of a profound sleep into the domain of apparent
wakefulness." Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183, 187 (1879), quoting F. WHARTON &
M. STILLE, A TREATISE ON MEDIcAL JURIsPRUDENcE § 151 (1855). See also H. BRILL,
supra note 3, at § 127.
16. People v. Worthington, 105 Cal. 166, 38 P. 689 (1894).
17. Corder v. Commonwealth, 278 S.W.2d 77 (Ky. 1955).
18. Virgin Islands v. Smith, 278 F.2d 169 (3d Cir. 1960); Smith v. Com-
monwealth, 268 S.W.2d 937 (Ky. 1954); People v. Magnus, 155 N.Y.S. 1013 (Ct. Gen.
Sess. 1915).
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ia,'0 delirium from fever or drugs,2" drunkenness, 21 and cerebral concus-
sion.22 However, the decisions with respect to these sources have not
been uniform 23 and, compounded by the variance among the states
concerning where the burden of the defense lies, the result has been
inconsistent case law that provides ample support even within a single
jurisdiction for different findings.24
The primary reason for this variance is the confusion over the
constituent element of crime-actus reus or mens rea2 5-- to which the
automatism defense relates. If the unconsciousness defense is catego-
rized as precluding "voluntariness," then the defense relates to the lack
of an actus reus. Such is the view in California.26 However, some stat-
utes and courts characterize the defense as relating to the presence or
absence of mens rea.2 7 This divergence over whether the defense is
connected with the "voluntary act" or the "guilty mind" produces two
19. H. BnRLL, supra note 3, at § 126.
20. See People v. Kelly, 10 Cal. 3d 565, 516 P.2d 875, 111 Cal. Rptr. 171 (Sup. Ct.
1973); Note, Drug Induced Insanity and Unconscousness-A Clarification of California
Law, 1 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 442 (1974).
21. See Lewis v. State, 196 Ga. 755, 27 S.E.2d 659 (1943). Although drunkenness
that results in a "black-out" condition may sometimes be considered a source of
unconsciousness or an affirmative defense in and of itself, it has been held that
"voluntary" drunkenness is an exception and provides no defense (for instance, when the
defendant has formed an intent to commit a crime and drinks to give himself courage to
commit it). State v. Arnold, 264 N.C. 348, 141 S.E.2d 473 (1965).
22. Carter v. State, 376 P.2d 351 (Okl. Crim. App. 1962).
23. Compare People v. Higgins, 5 N.Y.2d 607, 159 N.E.2d 179, 186 N.Y.S.2d 623
(Ct. App. 1959) (where the court did not differentiate between epilepsy and insanity)
with People v. Freeman, 61 Cal. App. 2d 110, 142 P.2d 435 (Dist. Ct. App. 1943)
(where the court held that insanity is not the same as epilepsy).
24. Compare Fain v. Commonwealth, 78 Ky. 183 (1879) with Tibbs v. Common-
wealth, 138 Ky. 558, 128 S.W. 871 (1910) for an example of this variance within
Kentucky.
25. See, e.g., 1 W. BuRtixcE, supra note 3, at § 96 where the elements of crime
are defined:
Every crime necessarily requires two elements. . . one biing physical the
other mental. The physical element is the prohibited thing done or the com-
manded thing left undone, or what is called "the act" [or the actus reus or the
voluntary act]. The mental element is the state or condition of -the doer's
mind which accompanies the act, the human will, otherwise known as "the
intent" [or the mens rea or the guilty mind].
26. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 26(5) (1970), quoted supra note 14. The actus reus
category is also the one chosen by the Model Penal Code:
(1) A person is not guilty of an offense unless his liability is based on
conduct which includes a voluntary act or the omission to perform an act of
which he is physically capable.
(2) The following are not voluntary acts within the meaning of this
Section:
(a) a reflex or convulsion;
(b) a bodily movement during unconsciousness or sleep; ....
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.01 (Prop. Official Draft, 1962) (emphasis added).
27. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 41-116 (1964).
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important consequences: the categorization of unconsciousness as de-
pendent upon mens rea instead of actus reus can result in (1) a confu-
sion with the insanity defense,28 and (2) a different burden of proof
upon the defendant (i.e., if. the focus is on actus reus, the burden is
on the State; if on mens rea, the burden will fall on the defendant).20
With respect to the first consequence, the equating of automatism
with insanity may in some instances seem somewhat purposeful due to
the results occasioned by pleading one defense as opposed to the other.
While, for example, a plea of "not guilty by reason of insanity" carries
with it in most jurisdictions a commitment for some definite term to a
mental hospital or institution for the criminally insane, the plea of "not
guilty by reason of unconsciousness" typically results in outright acquit-
tal of the defendant.30 Therefore, some courts utilize the association of
insanity with unconsciousness"' to preclude use of automatism as a
separate defense, instead recognizing the unconsciousness defense "as a
species of insanity."3 2 In this way, a focus on automatism as relating to
mens rea enables the court to confuse automatism with insanity and
serves as a device whereby the courts can dictate the result of pleas (and
strike a plea of automatism by the defendant) due to the courts' dislike
for the outright release afforded by the assertion of the unconsciousness
defense.
Concerning the burden-of-proof33 consequence in jurisdictions that
28. See text accompanying notes 31-33 infra. In fact, several authors list the
sources of unconsciousness under the general heading of "insanity" without a separate
discussion of automatism. See, e.g., 1 J. BisHop, supra note 3, at § 388.
29. See text accompanying notes 34-49 infra.
30. LAFAVE, supra note 3, 1 44, at 338.
31. Of course, the insanity defense always relates to the mens rea element of a
crime. The general test for insanity is "that at the time of the committing of the act, the
party accused was labouring under such a defect of reason, from disease of the mind, as
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was doing; or, if he did know it, that he
did not know he was doing what was wrong." M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718, 722
(H.L. 1843) (emphasis added). It is the meaning of "disease of the mind" that
frequently creates problems with respect to unconsciousness sources. Although, techni-
cally, unconscious acts caused by epilepsy, somnambulism, etc. are "diseases," most
courts that recognize automatism consider that such sources are not the "diseases" of
insanity. See, e.g., State v. Mercer, 275 N.C. 108, 165 S.E.2d 328 (1969).
32. Tibbs v. Commonwealth, 138 Ky. 558, 567, 128 S.W. 871, 874 (1910). The
court says in its opinion that it fails to see how evidence of somnambulism "would
constitute any defense other than that embraced in a plea of insanity." Id.
33. It is interesting to note that the United States Supreme Court has also wrestled
with the problem of the burden of proof when a mens rea type defense is asserted. See
Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, (1895). In that case the Court was torn between
placing a burden of proof to the satisfaction of the jury on the defendant or maintaining
the reasonable doubt burden on the prosecution. Justice Harlan decided that the
prosecution should have the burden because, otherwise, a burden on the defendant "is in
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recognize the distinction between insanity and unconsciousness, the
cases in two such jurisdictions provide an interesting comparison. In
California, where courts focus upon the actus reus, the burden of proof
is on the defendant merely to go forward with the evidence to raise a
reasonable doubt as to his consciousness,34 and the ultimate burden of
persuasion remains on the prosecution. Although the California courts
recognize that the law creates a presumption that when a person commits
an act, he is presumed conscious, it emphasizes that the "cardinal rule in
criminal cases [is] that the burden rests on the prosecution to prove the
offense beyond a reasonable doubt."35 Thus, one California court has
stated that "'[mien are presumed to be conscious when they act as if
they were conscious, and if they would have the jury know that things
are not what they seem, they must impart that knowledge by affirmative
proof [,] . .. [which] is merely another way of saying that defendant
has the burden of going forward."36  Thus, under this analysis, any
evidence produced by the defendant would be sufficient to raise such a
defense and to require the trial judge to instruct upon unconscious-
ness-even if the evidence is merely the defendant's statement that he
"remembers nothing' or that "it was hazy."3"
In contrast to California, the English courts have not been unified
in their allocation of the burden of proving consciousness and of per-
suading the jury. In Rex v. Harrison-Owen38 the defendant, who was
arrested in a home that was obviously being burglarized, testified that he
had "no recollection" of entering the house and that he must have done
so in a state of automatism. Lord Goddard stated that the defendant
was entitled to an automatism instruction because 'w]hen a prisoner
sets up such defences it is as well to leave the matter to the jury."39
effect to require him to establish his innocence, by proving that he is not guilty of the
crime charged." Id. at 487. The issue of unconsciousness itself has not been specifical-
ly dealt with by the Court. The tendency of the Court, however, has been to leave the
burden of proof on the prosecution and the Court may eventually extend this analysis to
the unconsciousness defense. See Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U.S. 684, 701-03 (1975).
34. See People v. Hardy, 33 Cal. 2d 52, 64, 198 P.2d 865, 872 (1948).
35. Id. at 63-64, 198 P.2d at 871.
36. Id. at 64-65, 198 P.2d at 872, quoting in part People v. Nihell, 144 Cal. 200,
202, 77 P. 916, 917 (1904).
37. See, e.g., People v. Wilson, 66 Cal. 2d 749, 427 P.2d 820, 59 Cal. Rptr. 156
(Sup. Ct. 1967) (where the court stated that the fact that evidence may not be of a
character to inspire belief does not authorize the refusal of an instruction based thereon).
But cf. Thomas v. State, 201 Tenn. 645, 301 S.W.2d 358 (1957) (where the court held
that a failure to remember what happened is alone not sufficient to present such an issue
to the jury).
38. [1951] 2 All E.R. 726 (Crim. App.).
39. Id. at 727.
1976] 1015
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Accordingly, this analysis was similar to that of the California courts
and focused upon the actus reus element of the crime.40 In a later case,
Regina v. Charlson,41 the defendant produced medical evidence of a
cerebral tumor and a history of ill health in the family; the court
instructed the jury as to unconsciousness, and the jury acquitted the
defendant despite the brutal nature of the crime.42 In response to this
"defect of the law" (i.e. the outright release for dangerous defend-
ants),43 the court the following year in Regina v. Kemp 14 muddled the
distinction between the insanity and unconsciousness defenses and ac-
cordingly refused to instruct the jury on unconsciousness.
After Kemp, Hill v. Baxter45 marked the initial policy change of
the English courts toward a shifting of the burden of proving automa-
tism to ffe defendant. In Hill no evidence of the defendants automa-
tous action other than his own testimony of "remembering nothing" was
presented. The same Lord Goddard of Harrison-Owen responded to
these facts: "[The onus of proving that [the defendant] was in a state
of automation must be on him. '[Automatism] is not only akin to a
defence of insanity but it is a rule of the law of evidence that the onus of
proving a fact which must be exclusively within the knowledge of a
party lies on him who asserts it."46 Thus, the British court had clearly
shifted to a mens rea analysis of the defense and had imposed some sort
of burden on the defendant.
The court in Bratty v. Attorney General for Northern Ireland47
attempted to answer the question whether the burden was that of going
40. Id. at 728 (where the court held that "[wihether [it is] a voluntary act or not
was a question for the jury") (emphasis added).
41. [1955] 1 All E.R. 859 (Chester Ass.).
42. The facts of the case show that the defendant-father called his ten-year-old son
to a window and then brutally assaulted him with a mallet. Id.
43. See Edwards, Automatism and Criminal Responsibility, 21 MODERN L. REV.
375 (1958) for a discussion of the dissatisfaction of the courts with automatism and
outright release afforded by the unconsciousness defense.
44. [1956] 3 All E.R. 249 (Bristol Ass.). In this case evidence of arteriosclerosis
was introduced as a cause of defendant's unconsciousness. The trial judge broadened the
"disease of the mind" focus of insanity to include these facts and thus preclude use of
automatism. The court was obviously focusing on the mens rea element of the crime.
45. [1958] 1 Q.B. 277.
46. Id. at 282. Lord Devlin in the same case also related that a defendant cannot
rely on the automatism defense without providing some evidence of it. Other language
in the opinion is that the nature of the burden is one of "going forward" but that there
must at least be some "prima facie" evidence before the defense can be relied on. He
hedged, however, by stating that he reserved "for future consideration. . . the question
of where the burden ultimately lies." Id. at 285.
47. [1961] 3 All E.R. 523 The facts of the case involved a murder of a young
girl and the defendant stated that he had a "feeling of blackness." Medical evidence
indicating a disease of the mind was also introduced.
[Vol. 54
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forward or whether the burden was one of at least a degree of persua-
sion on the defendant. The court concluded that a "proper foundation"
must be laid by the defendant before the evidence and charge of
unconsciousness will be submitted to the jury. Lord Kilmuir suggested
that the defense was similar to insanity and, concentrating on the mens
rea element, concluded that some sort of persuasion burden should be
on the defendant. However, Lords Denning and Morris spoke of the
necessity of a "voluntary act" and categorized the burden as merely one
of going forward; nevertheless, both still recognized the need of first
laying a proper foundation.4 8  Therefore, the court split in its analysis
and left authority for at least two divergent viewpoints with respect to
defendant's burden of proof.49
Although the North Carolina experience with automatism has been
limited to two cases, the conclusions of the state's supreme court have
been just as varied as those of the English courts. In State v. Mercer5 °
the trial judge limited the evidence of defendant's "black-out" to the
issue of intent. A unanimous supreme court, however, held that this
ruling was erroneous and cited California law as authority for
the proposition that "[u]nconsciousness is never an affirmative
defense . ." 1 and that even though the only evidence of automatism
was the defendant's own testimony, he was entitled to an instruction to
the jury that he could be found not guilty because of his unconscious-
48. Therefore, the burden advocated by Denning and Morris is not that of going
forward which typically requires that the defendant merely come forward and present
any evidence but is a slightly stricter burden requiring at least a proper foundation more
than the mere statements by the accused (i.e., some medical testimony is needed). Id. at
535-36. In this light, the Denning and Kilmuir proposals are not far apart, although
Denning would still leave the ultimate burden of persuasion on the state. Id. at 536.
49. As an example of the complications that resulted from this divergence, see
Regina v. Quick, "1973] 3 All E.R. 347 (where defendant assaulted the victim while in
diabetic shock and the court confessed confusion not only as to where the burden of the
defense lay but also as to whether such shock was the result of an internal disorder and
thus a "disease of the mind" precluding assertion of the unconsciousness defense); Beck,
Voluntary Conduct: Automatism, Insanity and Drunkenness, 9 CRIM. L.Q. 315 (1967)
(in which the author relates that three types of automatism have developed since Bratty:
(1) Sane automatism (involving a blow to the head and the actus reus element; the
burden is always on the Crown), (2) Insane automatism (resulting from internal
malfunction; the defendant has the burden of persuasion on the balance of probabilities),
and (3) Alcoholic automatism (raising the question of lack of intent to a specific intent
crime; the burden is on the Crown)). See also Sullivan, Self induced and Recurring
Automatism, 123 NEW L.. 1093 (1973) (in which the author discusses the turmoil cre-
ated by the unconsciousness defense).
50. 275 N.C. 108, 165 S.E.2d 328 (1969). The case involved a murder by the
defendant who testified that he was "blank in mind." No medical evidence concerning
the cause of the black-out or symptoms of somnambulism or epilepsy was introduced.
51. Id. at 117, 165 S.E.2d at 335.
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ness. No mention was made of English precedent or the likeness of the
defense to insanity. Automatism, then, in accord with California law,
was held to be a defense of "no voluntary act," as to which the state and
not the defendant had the ultimate burden of proof."
Caddell, six years later, not only marks an overruling of Mercer
and a refusal to follow California precedents, but also is indicative of the
recognition of British law precedents on the issue and the dissatisfaction
of courts in general with the automatism defense. The majority recog-
nized that there is variance with respect to the burden of proof 0
but decided that the rationale underlying the Hill decision and underly-
ing the "proper foundation" analysis of Lord Kilmuir in Bratty was
controlling. The court deemed this rationale to be that the defense of
unconsciousness is "like unto insanity" and "it does not necessarily
follow that the two defenses are different in law with respect to the
burden of proof" 54-both relate to the mens rea element, both involve
facts that are within the realm of knowledge of the defendant alone, and
both involve conclusive presumptions (in the case of insanity, the doing
of the act presumes conscious volition). 55 Although the court incorrect-
ly stated that Mercer was the only decision in which a court had allowed
a defendant's uncorroborated testimony of a "black-out" to be sufficient
to present the jury with the question of unconsciousness, 0 it was correct
in its interpretation of English precedent as authority for placing an
affirmative burden of proof on the defendant not only to produce
evidence constituting a "proper foundation" but also to persuade the
jury to their satisfaction that he was unconscious at the time of the
crime.
Chief Justice Sharp, joined by Justice Copeland, dissented from the
majority's conclusion that automatism is an affirmative defense and that
the burden of proving it is on the defendant. Her focus, in contrast to
52. Id. at 115, 165 S.E.2d at 334.
53. 287 N.C. at 286, 215 S.E.2d at 361.
54. Id. at 288, 215 S.E.2d at 362. The burden of proving insanity to the
satisfaction of the jury rests on the defendant. See State v. Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 213
S.E.2d 305 (1975); State v. Creech, 229 N.C. 662, 51 S.E.2d 348 (1949); State v. Swink,
229 N.C. 123, 47 S.E.2d 852 (1948); State v. Harris, 223 N.C. 697, 28 S.E.2d 232
(1943).
55. See Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1246 (1966) ("... the general criminal intent
necessary to conviction is deduced from the doing of the criminal act.") (emphasis
added).
56. 287 N.C. at 290, 215 S.E.2d at 363. Several California cases and at least one
early English case permitted automatism to be raised when the only evidence of it was
defendant's own testimony. See People v. Wilson, 66 Cal. 2d 749, 427 P.2d 820, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 156 (Sup. Ct. 1967) (cited supra note 37); Regina v. Harrison-Owen, [1951] 2
All E.R. 726 (Crim. App.) (cited supra note 39).
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that of the majority, was on the actus reus, 57 and, instead of analogizing
to the defense of insanity, she stated that "[It]he plea of unconsciousness
is analogous to a plea of accident or of alibi, neither of which is an
affirmative defense. Each plea merely negates an essential element of
the crime charged."5 She concluded that if defendant has a burden, it
is only that of going forward.59 The Chief Justice's analysis then
depended upon the actus reus and upon one of the "long-established
principles of our criminal jurisprudence--that the defendant has no
burden to prove his innocence." 60
Although the majority was at odds with the Chief Justice
and ostensibly violated "long-established" criminal jurisprudence with
its holding in Caddell, the decision appears to be a wise one and
compatible with current policy formulations. First, the decision comes
on the wings of the law-and-order movement of the seventies that
advocates a toughened judicial stance against crime. Such a position
then is consistent with the deterrence of criminal conduct, not by
depriving the innocent of his rights, but by simply forcing the defendant,
when the unusual automatism circumstances are involved, to provide a
proper foundation for the jury to believe that such circumstances were
actually present. The fear that the defendant will be deprived of an
unconsciousness plea because of lack of corroboration of his testimony is
in any event no different from the fear that an insanity plea will be
denied because not supported by medical evidence. Secondly, the focus
on mens rea seems justified because of the nature of the defense and its
close relationship with the mental element. Also, since evidence of
black-out or causes thereof lies entirely within the knowledge of the
57. 287 N.C. at 291, 215 S.E.2d at 364 (defendant "voluntarily committed the...
act charged"). Id. at 293, 215 S.E.2d at 366 ("possibility of a voluntary act"; "voluntary
act is an absolute requirement for criminal liability"), quoting IAFAvE, supra note 3, at
181.
58. Id. at 296, 215 S.E.2d at 367.
59. For support of her position, see Virgin Islands v. Smith, 278 F.2d 169 (3d Cir.
1960); People v. Hardy, 33 Cal. 2d 52, 64, 198 P.2d 865, 872 (1948); Lord
Morris's opinion in Bratty v. Attorney Gen. for N. Ireland, 11961] 3 All E.R. 523,
535-36. Justice Sharp has also espoused the same opinion concerning the burden of
proof with respect to the insanity defense. See State v. Cooper, 286 N.C. 549, 213
S.E.2d 305 (1975) (where she argued that the evidence introduced by defendant short of
the foundation necessary to take the issue of insanity to the jury should still be
considered in determining whether the accused formed the necessary intent; therefore,
she argued that the ultimate burden should always remain on the state).
60. 287 N.C. at 301, 215 S.E.2d at 370. See also N.C. CoNST. art. I, § 23; N.C.
GN. STAT. § 8-54 (1970). This long-established principle is the "cardinal rule" in
People v. Hardy, 33 Cal. 2d 52, 64, 198 P.2d 865, 872 (1948) (see note 34 supra) and
the "golden rule" of Lord Morris in Bratty v. Attorney Gen. for N. Ireland, [1961] 3 All
E.R. 523, 535-36 (see note 48 supra).
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defendant, the burden should be on him to bring out those facts that
tend to negate the presence of the guilty mind which is necessary to
convict. The presumption of consciousness deduced from the doing of
the proscribed act is controlling, and the defendant should show and
prove that at the time the act was committed, he was not conscious and
thus did not possess the intent requisite to the crime. Finally, in view of
the consequences of a plea of unconsciousness-acquittal and outright
release-the decision rightly embodies the judicial dislike for the de-
fense that has been categorized as "the refuge of guilty minds." Thus,
by making automatism an affirmative defense with burden of satisfac-
tion on the defendant, the court is simply hoping to close off an avenue
of outright release for the guilty defendant. In the long run, however,
the problems raised by this defense cannot be solved in one case; there-
fore it remains the job of the General Assembly to awaken from its own
automatous state and to clear the confusion surrounding the defense of
unconsciousness."'
JAMES M. ISEMAN, JR.
Criminal Procedure-North Carolina Rejects a Retroactive
Application of Mullaney
Homicide defendants in North Carolina who asserted that they had
acted in self-defense or in the heat of passion upon sudden provocation
were long required to "satisfy the jury" of the truth of their assertions.'
61. Several variances on the theme and solutions to the problems have been
proposed. See State v. Sikora, 44 NJ. 453, 210 A.2d 193 (1965) (in which an expert
witness psychiatrist proposed that the mens rea element be abolished because, in his
opinion, the "conscious is always the unwitting and unsuspecting puppet of the uncon-
scious." Id. at 458, 210 A.2d at 198); Beck, supra note 49 (in which Beck proposes that
the fault lies in a criminal code giving outright acquittal and that the legislature should
require some sort of compulsory treatment after the trial if an automatism defense is
asserted); Fingarette, Diminished Mental Capacity as a Criminal Law Defense, 37 Mou-
ERN L. REv. 264 (1974) (in which the author says that the defense of automatism is not
unconsciousness but is an "altered state" of conscious action where defendant has lost
"rational control of his conduct" and that the confusion can be alleviated by treating the
defense as such.); and Sullivan, supra note 49 (in which he suggests that a solution lies in
making the unconscious defendant criminally negligent if he had a previous history of
black-outs and the jury found that a reasonable man would have anticipated the
unconscious state which occurred).
1. State v. Barnett, 132 N.C. 1005, 43 S.E. 832 (1903). See also State v.
Freeman, 275 N.C. 662, 170 S.E.2d 461 (1969); State v. Miller, 112 N.C. 878, 17 S.E.
167 (1893); State v. Ellick, 60 N.C. 450 (1864).
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